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The purpose of this article is to explore the history and
status of the ownership of marsh or tide lands in South Caro-
lina.
Statements of the State Supreme Court in the Cape Ro-
maine case,1 and the affirmation thereof by the later Rice
Hope case,2 have been rather generally viewed as casting
doubt upon private ownership of such lands. Attempts have
been made to obtain title (a) by legislative enactment or
grant, after purchase of any interest of the State from the
Budget and Control Board,3 and (b) by legislation confirm-
ing title after continuous claim and payment of taxes.
4 How-
ever, purchase of the State's interest from the Budget and
Control Board apparently ceased after the ruling of the Attor-
ney General of April 2, 1957, 4 that the Board had no author-
ity to convey marshlands covered by tidal waters at normal'
high tide. This ruling did not interfere with the consti-
tutional provision permitting confirmation of titles by the
Legislature in its discretion;u however, following two rulings
from the Attorney General, dated March 27, 1959, and April
*This is Part I of a two part article. Part II will be published in a
subsequent issue of The South Carolina Law Quarterly.
tB. A. 1947 Yale University; L. L. B. 1950, University of Virginia;
Member S. C. House of Representatives, 1955-1958; Member, firm of
Cornish & Horlbeck, Attorneys, Charleston, S. C.
1. Cape Romaine Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Can-
ning Co., 148 S. C. 428, 146 S. E. 434 (1928).
2. Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Authority, 216
S. C. 500, 59 S. E. 2d 132 (1950).
3. See for example Acts No. 414 and 415 of 1955.
4. See for example Act No. 418 of 1955.
4a. S. C. OPS. AT'Y GEN. No. - (Apr. 2, 1957).
5. S. C. CONST. art. I, § 31 (1895).
And see for example, Act No. 519 of 1957, where title was confirmed
to marshlands, although the Governor did not sign the act and it became
law by reason of the provisions of Article IV, Section 23, S. C. Constitu-
tion, providing that a bill not returned within three days shall have the
same force as if he had signed it, unless the General Assembly adjourn to
prevent return.
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10, 1959,6 two bills passed by the legislature were vetoed by
the Governor. These 1959 rulings suggest the view that
grants or title confirmations of marshlands by the General
Assembly are forbidden by the Cape Romaine case, atpra.
Thus, although the right to grant lands still inheres in the
State Government,7 there is no apparent means for making
payment for lands granted, as required by statute.8 Of
course, if title is traced back to a valid grant of marshlands,
then title may be good; but since the Cape Romaine case and
subsequent Rice Hope case, lawyers generally have been
loathe to pass title to marsh lands, because statements in
those cases have been regarded as throwing doubt upon all
grants below mean high water mark in and on tidal navigable
streams, and doubt is created as to what a navigable stream
is, because the Cape Romaine case appears to constitute mars,-
lands as such a navigable stream as cannot be the subject
of grant.
If titles could be confirmed by the Legislature or some pro-
cedure established for purchase of valid grant, matters might
be cleared; or the Court might clarify the subject in a deci-
sion in a proper case. At any rate, the recent vetoes and
rulings by the Attorney General have excited considerable
interest in the problem of marshland titles.
In the light of this situation, it is appropriate to compile:
definitions of useful terms; a brief discussion of sovereignty
and tenure of lands, by individuals and by the State, and of
grants and power to grant marshlands; a resume' of the
common law and of federal and state statutes, an outline of
cases which have arisen concerning submerged lands in South
Carolina, with emphasis upon navigability and ownership of
submerged lands, including presumptions and burden of proof,
parties, ownership, rights and use, public and private, acts
of possession, boundaries, remedies and defenses; and a con-
clusion covering present status of marshland titles.
II. DEFINITIONS
At the time of the controversy over the so-called Tidelands
Oil Cases,9 (wherein the United States Supreme Court as-
6. S. C. Ors. ATT'Y GEN. No. 646 (Mar. 1959); S. C. Ops. ATr'y
GEN. No. 647 (Apr. 1959).
7. S. C. CONST. art. IV, § 19 (1895).
8. CODE or LAws OF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 1-794 (1952).
9. United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19, 91 L. Ed. 1889 (1947);
United States v. Louisana, 839 U. S. 669, 94 L. Ed. 1216 (1950); United
States v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707, 94 L. Ed. 689 (1950).
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.-serted the so-called "sliding interest rule" that the General
-Government had "paramount rights" in and power over the
.marginal sea lands of the states involved), the South Carolina
Law Quarterly printed a thorough article criticising those
decisions, and asserting the sovereignty of the States to such
]Iands. 10 While written in the sphere of relations between the
General Government and the several States and with par-
ticular reference to marginal sea lands, that article is gen-
erally pertinent here, and the definitions there used of "tide-
lands" and "marginal sea lands" are worth repeating.
Briefly, "tidelands" are those lands submerged by the flow
of the ocean tides and located between mean high water mark
and mean low water mark, while "marginal sea lands" are
those submerged lands extending seaward from mean low
water mark to the seaward boundaries of the sovereignty of
the State."
"Marshlands" is a term used herein synonymously with
"tidelands," because most of the South Carolina cases use the
word "marshlands," although the word "shore" or "shore-
lands" has been used to mean "tidelands." "Mean high water
mark" or "high water mark" is the point reached at the
height of an ordinary high or flood tide, and "mean low water
mark" or "low water mark" is the point reached at the depth
of the ordinary ebb tide, there being two times each lunar
10. 5 S. C. L. Q. 418 (1953).
11. The external boundaries of the United States have been held to
be the external boundaries of the several States, as the United States did
not acquire any territory after the Revolution, from the Treaty of Paris.
Harcourt v. Gaillard, 12 U. S. (12 Wheat) 523, 527 (1827). The statutory
boundary of the State of South Carolina is stated solely as "on the east
the State is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean." CODE OF LAWs OF SOUTH
CAROLINA § 39-1 (1952). By statute, waters and bottoms of bays, rivers,
and creeks "within the State or within three miles of any point along
low water mark on the coast thereof" and not previously granted, are
reserved as a common for the people of South Carolina for the taking
of fish, subject to acts of the General Assembly. CODD OF LAws OF SOUTH
CAROLINA § 28-754 (1952). By statute, the seaward boundaries of three
of the coastal counties are given as the Atlantic Ocean, Beaufort, (§
14-57); Georgetown, (§ 14-72); and Horry, (§ 14-76); while one county's
are co-extensive with the "line of jurisdiction of the State." Charleston,
(§ 14-60). Thus, there is authority for the three mile or one marine
Reague limit, although the Royal Charters of Carolina and other ancient
papers might shed further light, or same might be enlarged by act of
Congress. 5 S. C. L. Q. 423 (1953).
For recent decisions on the seaward boundaries of Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama in the original jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court, see United States v. Florida, 363 U. S. 121, 4 L. Ed. 2d
1096 (1960); and United States v. Louisiana, 363 U. S. 1, 4 L. Ed. 2d
1025 (1960), cited 46 A. B. A. J. 1219-1220 (1960).
[Vol. 14
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day when, due to the pull of the moon, the tides are in flood
and reach their crest at high tide, and two times in each day
when they ebb and diminish or recede at low tide. "Tidal"
means subject to the ebb and flow of the ocean tides. "Navi-
gable" should mean useful or capable of use for public com-
merce, but the term has been otherwise variously employed,
as will later be noticed. "Stream" is defined as a current of
water.12 A better term than "stream" is "watercourse,"
which is defined as a natural stream of water in a defined
channel, a "channel" being that portion of a watercourse
where flows the chief volume of water.
It would be helpful to visualize a channel or main water-
course as becoming wider and deeper as the tide flows in, the
boundaries of said channel being visualized as ceasing at
those points where navigability in fact ceases and the non-
navigability of the tideland begins. However, the Courts have
used other definitions, as will be seen below.
"Bank" means an elevation or formation of soil or land
which confines the waters of a watercourse when they rise
out of the bed, and "bed" of a stream should mean the
land that is covered by tidal waters at low tide, and, thus, be-
low low water mark.' 3 A riparian owner is one owning land
on the bank of a stream or watercourse, while a littoral owner
is one owning land on the shores of seas or great lakes.J4
Defining land titles by reference to water marks makes for
difficulty, and one of the chief difficulties with marshland
titles in South Carolina today is that dicta in the Cape Ro-
maine case apparently held that marshland is land located
"in tidal navigable streams."
Both the word "navigable" and the word "stream" need
more precise definition. The word "stream," meaning a de-
finable body of water, is not a good word to use when de-
scribing a vast expanse of several thousand acres of marsh-
land concealed under water at high tide. The word "navi-
gable" is not an accurate word to use in describing waters
over marshlands at mean high water mark when the depth of
the waters is not over one or two feet, scarcely enough to
support a boat of extremely shallow draft.
What happens twice in each lunar day is that the water,
12. BLACK, LAW DICTIo3TARY (4th ed. 1951).
13. State v. Oak Point Mines, 22 S. C. 593, 601-602 (1884).
14. BLAcK, LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1951).
19621
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at high tide, overflows the banks of the watercourse and
floods the tidal marshes, and then completely drains away
again, only to commence the cycle of ebb and flood all over
again. Twice in each lunar day, due to the pull of the moon,
the water floods in toward the land during the flood stage
of the tides, and twice the direction is reversed during ebb
tide where the flow is away from the land.
Since the writing of the article concerning marginal sea
lands, the United States Congress has enacted the "Sub-
merged Lands Act."'I5 This Act released and relinquished to
the several States or to those who on June 5, 1950, were
entitled under state law, all right, title and interest of the
United States in and to "lands beneath navigable waters
within the boundaries of the respective States," expressly
reserving to the United States (a) powers over the same for
purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense and in-
ternational affairs, which are stated to be paramount to but
not to include proprietary rights of ownership, and (b) re-
serving also the right to buy at prevailing market prices or
to condemn submerged lands needed for national defense,
and (c) reserving constitutional authority over flood control
and production of power. The Act recognized grants and
leases to individuals previously made by the States or by
predecessor sovereigns."0 For the purposes of the act, "navi-
gable" was defined to include, inter alia, "all lands perma-
nently or periodically covered by tidal waters up to but not
above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line three
geographical miles distant from the coast line of each such
State and to the boundary line of each such State where in
any case such boundary as it existed at the time such State
became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved
by Congress extends seaward ... beyond three geographical
miles. . . . '' This Act has held constitutional,' s and its
general effect was to remove the Federal Government from
the field of tidelands except for the powers reserved, and
leave the same to the States.
Therefore, it is important to determine what law applies
15. Popularly known as the Tidelands Oil Act, 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1301-1343 (Supp. V, 1958), and recently construed in United States
v. Louisiana and United States v. Florida, note 11, supra.
16. 43 U. S. C. A. § 1311 (a) (2) (Supp. V, 1958).
17. 43 U. S. C. A. § 1301 (a) (2) (Supp. V, 1958).
18. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U. S. 272, 98 L. Ed. 689 (1954). (Justices
Black and Douglas dissenting).
[Vol. 14
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in South Carolina, because the use of high water mark by
the Federal Government to define the limit of its easement
for navigation does not require a State to use the same defini-
tion, unless this is deemed by the General Assembly and the
Courts to be in the public interest.
III. SOVEREIGNTY AND POWER TO GRANT
Sovereignty of the territory comprising South Carolina
was first held by the Crown, then by the Lord Proprietors,
in tenure of the Crown, until 1719,19 and then by the Crown.
itself, before Sovereignty passed to the State of South Caro-
lina in 1776, when the Provincial Congress of South Caro-
lina met and formed an independent republic. 20 Later, partial
Sovereignty was delegated to the United States, first by the
Articles of Confederation, then by the present Constitution
of the United States.
The State of South Carolina "succeeded at the Revolution
to all of the rights of the British Crown, one of which as,
Lord Coke tells us, was 'that all lands are holden mediately
or immediately of the King.' "21 The State succeeded to the
tenure and titles of lands not previously granted, but recog-
nized previous valid grants.22 There are statutes which ex-
pressly validate grants prior to 1731,23 and prior to. July 4,
1776.24
19. SIMMS, HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA (revised edition, Russell &
Jones) at 91-94 § 2 (1860); THE SOUTH IN THE BuImING OF THE NATION
at 31 (1909).
20. Simms, id. at 30.
21. State v. Pinckney, 22 S. C. 484, 502 (1884).
22. There can be no doubt that all lands in this state are held under
the sovereign,-first the royal authority of Great Britain, and
afterwards the State of South Carolina, the successor to all of its
rights. And when the state sets up her claim, prima facie the
right must be in her. To require proof from her that she has
not granted the land would require proof of a negative. The argu-
ment is plausible enough to be sound. At all events, we are bound
by it, as the utterance of the supreme court of the state upon
a local law affecting property rights. But the State of South Car-
olina succeeded to the obligations as well as the rights of the crown.
She became, upon the Revolution, the owner of lands not granted
by her predecessor. She is bound by those grants. This qualifi-
cation is admitted even by the case of the Pacific Guano Company
which, under pressure of public opinion, carried the supposed
rights of the state to an extreme limit. If it be shown that the
lands had once been granted by the crown, the presumption in
favor of the state is at an end, and upon those who assert her
claims devolves the burden of proving either that the grant was
void, or that subsequent thereto she had in some way reacquired
title. Chisolm v. Caines, 67 Fed. 285, 287 (1894).
28. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 57-52 (1952).
24. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUT CAROLINA § 57-57 (1952).
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Our State Supreme Court has held that the State can hold
tenure to tidelands, grant them to citizens and tax them
when granted.26 In State v. Pinckney, it was held:
That salt marsh has for one hundred years been con-
sidered by the general assembly of this State as such
land as when vacant was owned by the state appears
from the act of 1784 (4 Stat., 627) to raise supplies. By
this act 'all lands granted by the State' were classified
and rated for taxation. This classification was con-
tinued from year to year in the annual acts to raise sup-
plies, until the year 1815. In that year an act to fix the
value of lands in the state for taxation, &c (6 Stat., 7)
was passed. In all these acts salt marsh is included as
taxable when granted. In addition to this, the state has
from ancient times actually exercised the power to grant
lands of this description without question. See act of
1787 (5 Stat., 39, par. 4) ; and act of 1836 (7 Stat., 151).
See also grant of marsh land to William Fripp in 1787,
in evidence in this case. From this it appears that there
is nothing in the fact that land is marsh land to affect
the nature of the state's tenure of the soil.26
In State v. South Carolina Phosphate Co.,27 the opinion of
the Circuit Court, ordered to be reported by the Court in
State v. Pacific Guano Co.,28 includes a precise definition of
"vacant lands," and sufficient statutory authority to show
that marsh lands were treated as other lands, were subject
to grant and to taxation:
... Vacant lands, in the sense of our statutes, are lands
that have not been 'taken up' by individuals, nor appro-
priated to particular public purposes....
It appears, therefore, that there is nothing in the legal
signification of the term 'vacant land,' to restrict its ap-
25. State v. Pinckney, 22 S. C. 484 (1884); Oak Point Mines, 22 S. C.
593 (1884).
26. Id. at 488-489. Judge Simonton held in Chisoim v. Caines, supra,
note 22, that "The uniform rule in South Carolina has been to treat
marsh lands as subject to grant, to grant them and to tax them when
granted." 4 Stat. at Large 627; 5 Stat. at Large 39; 6 Stat. at Large 7;
State v. Pacific Guano, 22 S. C. 50; State v. Pinckney, 22 S. C. 488;
Frarapton v. Wheat, 27 S. C. 293, 3 S. E. 462; State v. S. C. Phosphate Co.,
22 S. C. 593; Chamberlain v. R.R., 19 S. E. 743, 67 Fed. 285 (1894).
27. 22 S. C. 593, at 600, 601 (1884).
28. 22 S. C. 50 (1884).
[Vol. 14
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plication, so as to exclude land covered by water, which
has not been appropriated to individual or public use,
by authority of law. (Italics added.)
That land flowed by the tide is the subject of grant.
in this state is conclusively shown by statutes in which
'all lands granted in this state' were classified and rated
for purposes of taxation. The first of these was the
act of 1784 (4 Stat., 627) to raise supplies. This classi-
fication was continued in the supply acts of each suc-
ceeding year until 1815, when it was made permanent
by 'An act to fix the value of lands in this state for
taxation,' etc. (6 Stat., 7). In these acts 'tide swamp
not generally affected by salt or freshets' and 'salt
marsh' proved to be 'incapable of immediate cultivation'
are set down, the first taking rank as the most valuable
land in the state. There is no trace of any special legis-
lation providing for the location and grant of lands of
this character, and the necessary inference is that they
were disposed of under the general regulations pre-
scribed by the statutes relating to vacant lands.
An act-of 1714 (7 Stat., 61 and 62, Sections 3 and 5)
recognizes claims of individuals, under grant of convey-
ance to sundry lots on the bay in Charleston, 'from high
to low water mark,' and imposes penalties and forfeiture
for neglect by such claimants to build their proportion
of the sea wall. An act of 1719 (7 Stat., 69, Section 20),
reciting that owners of front lots on the bay were dis-
couraged from building their part of the sea wall by
reason of others claiming lots before them to low water
mark, provides a mode of adjusting disputes, and de-
clares that upon failure of the claimant of the lower lot
to present his claim within a stated time, said lot should
be vested in the owner of the front lot, 'he paying to the
owner of the lot to the eastward from high to low water
mark his full charges that he was at for his grant for
the same,' etc; and section 22 provides that 'upon the
title to the front and lower lots becoming vested in the
same person, they should not again be separated, and if
the front lot should be disposed of by sale or gift, the
other should go along with it as an appurtenance.'
An act of 1787 (5 Stat., 39, Section 4) allowed persons
to carry off oysters and oyster shells below high water
1962] 295
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mark from land for which surveys had been taken out
but not passed and confirmed by grants under the sig-
nature of the governor since the opening of the land
office by the act of 1784. And Section 6 allowed owners
of wharves and low water lots in Charleston exclusive
privilege, for six months after the passage of the act,
of obtaining grants for land covered by water in front
of their wharves or lots as far as the western channel
of Cooper River and the northern channel of Ashley
River. By act of 1836 (7 Stat., 151) all vacant land are
not legally vested in individuals in the harbor of Charles-
ton, covered by water, was vested in the city council of
Charleston for public purposes, etc.
IV. EXAMPLES OF MARSHLAND GRANTS
In the Office of the South Carolina Secretary of State
and the Historical Commission of South Carolina are found
many grant and plat books and indices in various states of
use, covering grants of lands by the Lord Proprietors, the
Crown of England, and, later, by the State of South Caro-
lina. Among these valuable records may be found many
grants of marshlands, and plats thereof.
From a perusal of these grant books, and the plats thereof,
it is apparent that it was the custom at all periods in our
State's history to treat marshlands as being subject to grant-
by the Lord Proprietors, by the Crown, and by the State.
Sometimes these grants refer simply to "lands," sometimes
expressly "marsh lands," sometimes "broken islands and
marshes," sometimes "rush lands," "low lands," "sands" or
simply "marshes." Thus, we find at page 167 of Salley's
Warrants for Lands in South Carolina, 1692-1711, the follow-
ing random examples of grants from the Lord Proprietors:
Mr. Isac Mazicq had a warrt. out of ye Secretarys Of-
fice for all that marshland which bounds to ye Southward
on ye Plantation of said Mazick near Charles Town to
ye Northward on ye Plantation lately belonging to Rich-
ard Tradd now belonging to said Mazicq, and So to ye
head of said Marsh. Dated ye 28th day of February
Anno D., 1700.
And on page 191 of the same volume, that
Thomas Pinckney had a Wart. for all ye marsh leying
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Typical phraseology,-acreage, location and names being
omitted,-as taken from an actual grant by the Crown in
1768, in Royal Grant Books, Office of the Secretary of State,
reads in part:
Know Ye that We, of our special Grace, certain Know-
ledge and mere Motion, have given and granted, and by
these Presents for Us, our Heirs and Successors, DO
GIVE AND GRANT unto - his Heirs
and Assigns, a Plantation or Tract of Land containing
_acres of Marsh Land on the North East
part of the near. in
County Bounded on the West by lands of the
said , to the North East by vacant
marsh, to the East by a small Creek to the South by the
said
And hath such Shape, Form and Marks, as appear by
a Plat thereof, hereunto annexed: Together with all
Woods, Underwoods, Timber and Trees, Lakes, Ponds,
Fishings, Waters, Water-Courses, Profits, Commodities,
Appurtenances and Hereditaments, whatsoever there-
unto belonging, or in anywise appertaining: Together
with Privelege of Hunting, Hawking and Fowling in
and upon the same, and all Mines and Minerals whatso-
ever; Saving and Reserving, nevertheless, to Us, Our
Heirs and Successors, all white Pine Trees, if any there
should be found growing thereon; and also Saving and
Reserving, nevertheless, to Us, our Heirs and Successors,
One Tenth Part of Mines of Gold and Silver only: (Em-
* phasis added.)
Typical phraseology of an actual Grant from the State of
South Carolina in the decade of the 1850's, omitting acreage,
location and names, reads:
Know Ye, that in Pursuance of an Act of the Legisla-
ture, entitled 'An Act for establishing the mode of grant-
ing the lands now vacant in this State, and for allowing a
cummutation to be received for some lands that have
been granted,' passed the 19th day of February, 1791;
We have granted, and by these presents DO GRANT
unto bhis heirs and assigns, a plantation or tract
of land, containing- acres surveyed for him
the- day of, situate in
19621
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District- -____ Parish on the Sea Shore and_-
Creek, having such shape, form and marks
as are here represented by a plat hereunto annexed, to-
gether with all woods, trees, waters, water-courses, prof-
its, commodities, appurtenances and hereditaments what-
soever, thereunto belonging.... (Emphasis added.)
Generally, both Royal and State Grants contained at the
bottom thereof a place for the Certificate of the Surveyor
General's signature and date, the certificate in each case
reading, "And hath thereunto a Plat thereof annexed, repre-
senting the same, certified by -, Surveyor Gen-
eral." It has generally proven more difficult to locate plats
of grants by the Lord Proprietors, than plats of Royal or
State Grants.
V. THE COMMON LAW
Our Court often held that the common law of England is
in force in the State of South Carolina, unless repealed or
modified by statute.29 A presumption exists that no change in
the common law was intended by any statute unless the lan-
guage employed clearly indicates such intention.30 But state
courts, in construing the common law existing in the state,
are not necessarily bound by decisions of courts of England.3 '
It becomes of some interest then, to see what appears to
have been the common law in regard to ownership of sub-
merged lands.
In Chapter 6 of Hale's De Jure Maris, referred to in
Shirley v. Bowlby,32 he says:
The seashore and the maritime increases belong, prima
facie, to the king; yet they may belong to the subject, in
point of propriety, not only by charter or grants thereof,
there can be but little doubt, but also by prescription or
usage.
Hale defined the shore or seashore (litus maris) to mean
land between common high and low water mark,33 and
29. State v. Charleston Bridge Co., 113 S. 0. 116, 101 S. E. 657
(1919); O'Hagan v. Fraternal Aid Union, 144 S. C. 84, 141 S. E. 893(1928).
30. Coakley v. Tidewater Constr. Corp., 194 S. C. 284, 9 S. E. 2d 724
(1940); Nuckolis v. Great A & P Tea Co., 192 S. C. 156, 5 S. E. 2d 862
(1939).
31, State v. Wilson, 162 S. C. 413, 161 S. E. 104 (1931).
32. 152 U. S. 1, 11, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1894).
33. BLAcx, LAw DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1951) p. 1125.
[Vol. 14
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said it might belong to a subject in gross or as parcel of
a manor.
3 4
At an early period, England claimed dominion over the
seas surrounding her coasts, and, in maintaining the Crown's
right to those waters, included also title to the fundus mar/s,
or bed of the sea; 35 and, from this claim of the Crown to
sovereignty over the seas, stemmed the rule that the King
claims lands under the seas within the territory of England,
apart from ownership of the adjoining highlands, due to his
claim over the ocean.3 6
Lord Hale, in DeJure Marls, Chapter 6, as quoted by Gould,
writes as follows on this subject:
The King of England hath the propriety as well as the
jurisdiction of the narrow seas; for he is in a capacity
of acquiring the narrow and adjacent sea to his domin-
ion by, a kind of possession which is not compatible to a
subject; and accordingly regularly the king-hath the pro-
priety in the sea; but a subject hath lot nor indeed can-
not have that property in the sea, through a whole tract
of it, as the king hath; because without a regular power
he cannot possibly possess it. But, though a subject
cannot acquire the interest of the narrow seas, yet he may
by usage and prescription acquire an interest in so much
of the sea as he may reasonably possess, VIZ., of a dis-
trictus *utris, a place in the sea between such points, or
a particular part contiguous to the shore, or of a port or
creek or arm of the sea. These may be possessed by a
subject and prescribed in point of interest both of the
water, and the soil itself covered with the water, and the
soil itself covered with the water within such a precinct;
for these are manoriable, and may be entirely possessed
by a subject.Y7 (Italics added.)
34. Hale, as cited in Chisolm v. Caines, 67 Fed. 285, at 290, 291
(1894).
35. GouLD, LAW OF WATERS § 3 (2d ed. 1891).
36. Id. § 19.
37. Id. § 3 at 5, 6 n. 2. § 3, 2. There has been some controversy over
Hale's authorship of this work. In Johnson v. Barrett, Aleyn 10 (1646),
it was held that if a wharf were erected below low water mark, it was
Crown property of common right, but if between high and low mark,
belonged to the owner of the adjoining land, and plaintiff had judgment,
in an action of trespass. Hale was of counsel in this case, and unsuccess-
fully argued for the right of the crown, but did not refer to the case in
his treatise, DE Juan MABIs, bheing a work posthumously published.
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The rights of the Crown were two-fold in navigable waters:
first, the jus publicum, a right of jurisdiction and control for
the benefit of subjects similar to the right of jurisdiction
over highways on land, though the soil may be in the owners
of adjoining estates, so that the king may protect the rights
of the public for navigation and fishing; and second, the jus
p ivatum, or the Crown's feudal or private right, which is
subject to the jus Publicum and cannot be conveyed free from
the jus publicum or public rights of navigation and fishery.
38
A violation of the jus publicum was held to create a public
nuisance, while an invasion of the jus privatum or propri-
etary interest of the Crown was called a purpresture, being
an encroachment upon the king by a littoral owner without
grant or license from the Crown, even though public rights
of navigation and fishery were not thereby impaired. The
remedy for nuisance is an abatement in civil courts, or an
indictment for maintaining nuisance; while for a purpresture,
which is a term sometimes incorrectly used for nuisance, the
remedy is either by information of intrusion at common law
or by information in equity at the suit of the attorney general,
or by civil suit for abatement. Of course, if an invasion be
of both the jus publicum and the jus privatum, it is held a
nuisance, and may be the subject of a private action of in-
dividuals sustaining a distinct injury other than that sus-
tained by the public at large.39
The right to the soil between high and low water mark was
prima facie in the Crown, and although title might be in a
subject, according to the terms of the grant, yet the burden
was upon those who set up an adverse title.40 Under a royal
grant no alienation may be presumed beyond what is clearly
expressed.41 But where title to submerged lands is claimed
by the owner of the adjoining lands, usage has been held
admissible to interpret the grant 42 and to establish a title to
lands between high and low water mark as part of the adjoin-
ing lands. Gould lists these acts of usage or ownership as
being erection of embankments,
43
38. Gould, op. cit. § 17.
39. Id. § 21.
40. Id. § 19, at 41 n. 1.
41. Id. § 23, at 50 n. 3, citing Royal Fishery of the Banne, Sir John
Davies, 149; Somerset v. Fogwell, 5 B & C 375; Attorney General v.
Farmen, 2 Lev. 171.
42. Id. § 23.
43. Id. § 23.
300 [Vol. 14
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constant and usual fetching gravel and seaweed and sea-
sand between the high-water and low-water mark, and
licensing others so to do; inclosing and imbanking
against the sea, and enjoyment of what is so inned; en-
joyment of wrecks happening upon the sand; present-
ment and punishment of purprestures there in the court
of a manor; and such like.
44
The public has no right to remove sand, soil or shell-fish from
a private beach, nor from a public beach where the title re-
mains in the Crown; 45 and the same with seaweed. Ancient
deeds and plats may be placed in evidence to show the location
of a creek which has been filled since making such deeds and
plats.46
The Crown could grant to a subject the soil of tidal non-
navigable waters, and also exclusive rights of fishery therein.
The shore between high and low water mark "may be, and
commonly is," parcel of the manor adjacent, and a subject
might possess the creeks or smaller arms of the sea, but not
those portions of the sea which would require a naval arma-
ment for their defense against foreign powers.
47
In more modern times, it has been held incompetent for
the Crown to abridge or destroy the public rights of either
navigation or fishery,4 8 but at the time the American Colonies
were being colonized from abroad, the present doctrines had
44. Id. § 22.
45. Id. § 24.
46. Id. §§ 23, 25.
47. Chisolm v. Caines, 67 Fed. 285, at 290, 291 (1894); GoUw, op.
cit., § 21, 43, 44, quoting HA r, DE JuRE MARis, Chap. 4, II, 3.
Lilly, writing prior to publication of Dn JuRE MARIs, States,
"Lands between the high-water and low-water mark belong to the lord of
the manor next adjoining, as part of his manor; and he can claim by
prescription to have wreck and fishing there." 2 Lilly's Practical Register,
tit. Rights, quoted in GouLD, op. cit. § 18, at 38 n. 1.
In Lord Advocate v. Blantyre, 4 App. Cas 770, 773 note, as quoted
by Gould, Lord Curriehill, Lord Ordinary, said in the court below:
"There is no longer any doubt, if such ever existed, that the foreshore of
the sea and of navigable rivers, though belonging to the Crown, subject
to certain public uses connected with navigation and the like, are never-
theless alienable by the Crown subject to such public uses." GOULD, op.
cit., § 18, at 37 n. 1.
But there must have been some controversy, as one writer sug.
gested that "if it were understood that the soil between high and low
water mark might belong to a subject by grant or prescription, as might
well be the fact, and that the soil below low-water mark belonged to the
Crown, as being of little or no value as the subject of a grant, there
would be no difficulty in reconciling . . . opinions . . . ." WooRYcH,
WATERS, 20, as cited and quoted by GOULD, op. cit., § 18, at 38 n. 1.
48. GouLD, op. cit., § 21 at 44.
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not been settled in England.4 9 No instance is known where
the Crown, for its own benefit, ever made claim for any ex-
clusive rights under jus privatum50 in the tide waters of the
provinces in America or in the soil under them.51
Blackstone says, "By the feudal law all navigable rivers
and havens were computed among the regalia, and were sub-
ject to the sovereign of the state. And in England it hath
always been holden, that the king is lord of the whole shore,
..,"52 He writes that the erection of beacons and lighthouses
and sea marks is part of the royal prerogative, usually exer-
cised by the lord high admiral under letters patent.53
Blackstone defined the word "land" to include
[.... not only the face of the earth, but everything under
it, or over it. And therefore, if a man grants all his
lands, he grants thereby all his mines of metal, and other
fossils, his woods, his waters, and his houses, as well as
his fields and meadows. Not but the particular names
of the things are equally sufficient to pass them, except
in the instance of water; by a grant of which, nothing
passes but the right of fishing ... ]54
Blackstone says elsewhere that an action cannot be brought
for water as such, but that action must be brought "for the
land that lies at the bottom, and must call it twenty acres of
land covered with water," the reasoning being that water is
a "moveable wandering thing, and must of necessity con-
tinue common . . ." while the land which that water covers,
is ". . . . permanent, fixed, and immoveable. . . ."55 In the
same passage, quoting Sir Edward Coke, he writes that land
"... comprehendeth in its legal signification any ground, soil,
or earth whatsoever; as arable, meadows, pastures, woods,
moors, waters, marshes, furzes and heath. . . ." (Italics
49. Id. § 18.
50. Sergeant Merewether searched the Saxon charters and laws,
Domes-day book and ancient legal writings and cases without finding
any trace of the royal right to jus privatum, or theory to support the
same, and attributed the arising of the theory to the arbitrary reigns of
the Stuarts and their claim of the royal prerogative by devine right of
kings. GOULD, op. cit., § 17, at 36.
51. GOULD, op. cit., § 31, at 72.
52. I BLACKSTONE, ch. 7, "Of the King's Prerogative" (Christian ed.
1818).
53. I BLACKSTONE, ch. 7. (Christian ed. 1818).
54. II BLACKSTONE, ch. 2, "Of Real Property" (Christian ed. 1818).
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added.) Of "alluvion," the gradual gaining of land from the
sea, and of "dereliction," when the sea shrinks back below
the usual watermark, Blackstone says that it shall go to the
owner of the land adjoining, but, if sudden or considerable,
then to the king; and the same with arising of small islands
in rivers, which pass to the owner or the proprietor of the
nearest adjacent shore, but if arising in the middle, "where
the soil of the river is equally divided between the owners of
the opposite shores," in common to those who have lands on
each side thereof, but to the king, if a new island arise in
the sea, for whatever has no other owner, vests by law in
the king.56
Blackstone recognized three types of fishing rights: a com-
mon of piscary was a liberty of fishing in another man's
water; a free fishery was an exclusive right of fishing in a
public river, being a royal franchise, even though the making
of such grants was prohibited by Magna Charta; and a
several fishery, wherein the owner "must also be (or at least
derive his right from) the owner of the soil... ."57 However,
he acknowledged the three species of fishery to be very much
"confounded" in the law books.58
VI. FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
It is not the purpose of this article to dwell on the interests
of the Federal Government in tidelands, as these may be re-
garded as having been clarified in and by the Submerged
Lands Act. 9 Although some of the powers next enumerated
have been generally regarded as inapplicable (particularly
the treaty making and general welfare powers), they have
been listed 0 as the war power,61 the commerce power or
power over navigation, 2 power of eminent domain, 63 the
treaty making power, 4 and the general welfare power.6
With regard to the navigation power, the federal statute
prohibits alteration of the channel of a navigable water with-
56. II BLACKSTONE, Chap. 16, "Title by Occupancy" (Christian ed.
1818).
57. Ibid., Chap. 3, "Of Incorporeal Hereditaments."
58. Ibid.
59. Supra, notes 15-18.
60. See generally, Woodbridge, Rights of the States in Their Natural
Resources Particularly as Applied to Water, 5 S. C. L. Q. 130 (1952).
61. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Clauses 1 and 11, and art. I § 9, Clause 7.
62. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
63. Id. at art. IV, § 3.
64. Id. at art. VI.
65. Id. at art. I, § 8.
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out prior approval of the Secretary of the Army."" The Secre-
tary of the Army authorizes wharves, docks, breakwaters and
other structures in navigable waters, and may establish har-
bor lines to which structures may be extended without per-
mission.0 7 His approval, or that of the Army Engineers, is
required prior to construction for the location and plans of
bridges, dams and causeways across navigable waters.
8
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTES OF SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Granting of Lands
Most of the State Statutes relate to lands of the state, va-
cant and ungranted. There are many sections of our code
and Constitution which closely relate to private ownership
of marshlands.
The present Constitution of the State of South Carolina
provides that "All grant... shall be issued in the name and
by the authority of the State of South Carolina, Sealed with
the Great Seal, Signed by the Governor, and countersigned
by the Secretary of State." 69 It also provides that lands "be-
longing to or under the control of the State shall never be
donated, directly or indirectly. . ." nor sold to corporations
for a price less than that for which it can be sold to individ-
uals; but the General Assembly may grant a right of way not
exceeding one hundred fifty feet to railroads across State
land, and in its discretion, may "confirm the title to lands
claimed to belong to the State, but used or possessed by other
parties under an adverse claim."' 0
By statute "no grant of vacant lands shall be issued except
to actual purchasers thereof for value" ;71 and the State Bud-
get and Control Board ". . . shall sell and convey, for and on
behalf of the State, all such real ... property ... belonging
to the State as not in actual public use ... from time to time
in such manner and upon such terms as it may deem most
advantageous to the State.. .," but this section "... shall not
be construed to authorize the sale... of any property held in
trust for a specific purpose by the State or the property of
66. 33 U. S. C. A. § 403 (1957).
67. 33 U. S. C. A. § 404 (1957).
68. 30 Stat. 1151; 33 U. S. C. A. §§ 401, 491, 523-533; 34 Stat. 84;
60 Stat. 847.
69. S. C. CONST., art. IV, § 19.
70. Id. at § 31.
71. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAnOLNA § 1-794 (1952).
[Vol. 14
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the State in the phosphate rocks or phosphatic deposits in the
beds of the navigable streams and waters and marshes of the
State."72
B. Confirming Certain Grants
By statute all persons possessed of lands by and under
any original grants, patents or deeds by the Lord Proprietors
of any three of them or their deputies, are guaranteed quiet
enjoyment against the State forever.7 3 Such grants are ex-
pressly validated notwithstanding omission of names of the.
proprietors; any want of significant and necessary words im
law for conveying such lands; want of a proper seal; insuf-
ficient description in such grants if all or part of such lands;
have been surveyed by a sworn surveyor or certified before
August 20, 1731; any want of livery and seisin or enrollment,
if the heirs of a grantee caused such lands to be meted out,
or ascertained to them by survey; or any other defect, omis-
sion or commission in form or substance, law or fact, if such
lands or some part have been meted out or ascertained to
grantees or returned into the late Surveyor General's office
as aforesaid, before August 20, 1731.74 Grants which comply
with these conditions are ratified;7 5 and no grant, patent,
etc., prior to August 20, 1731, shall be impeached for want
of certain ceremonies or for certain named defects, if good
but for those defects.7
6
By statute the Act by which the Lord Proprietors sur-
rendered their titles in the Province of South Carolina to
the King is confirmed as are the titles of John Lord Car-
taret.77
Another code section provides that actual peaceable and
quiet possession of lands five years previous to July 4, 1776,
72. Id. at § 1-793 (1952). The Attorney General, by his opinion of
April 2, 1957, advised the Budget and Control Board that since marsh
lands are held by the State for navigation, fishing and other public pur-
poses, the Board did not have the right under this section, to sell marsh
lands. Query, whether, even under this ruling, the Board could sell marsh
lands previously validly granted, title to which returned to the Board or
its predecessor, the Sinking Fund Commission, for failure to pay taxes,
provided phosphatic deposits be reserved? Also, under S. C. CONST., arL
III, § 31 could not the General Assembly confirm titles in its discretion,
despite this ruling?
73. CODE: OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLiNA § 57-52 (1952).
74. Id. at § 57-53 (1952).
75. Id. at § 57-54 (1952).
76. Id. at § 57-56.
77. Id. at § 57-55.
1962]
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss2/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
shall be deemed a good and sufficient title, and any subse-
quent grant of the same land or grant later obtained is de-
clared null and void.
7 8
C. Navigable Waters
The State Constitution provides that "All navigable waters
shall forever remain public highways free to the citizens
of the State and the United States without tax, impost or
toll imposed" and that no tax shall be imposed for the use
of the shores or any wharf "erected on the shores or in or
over the waters of any navigable stream unless... authorized
by the General Assembly. 1' 9 The State has concurrent juris-
diction over all rivers forming boundary with another State,
and these rivers are common highways without tax unless
expressly provided by the General Assembly.
80
By Statute "all streams... capable of being navigated by
rafts of lumber or timber by the removal of accidental ob-
structions, and all navigable watercourses and cuts are here-
by declared navigable streams and... shall be common high-
ways and forever free.. ." unless taxed by the Legislature. 81
Landowners have the statutory duty to clean out all streams
-upon and adjacent to their lands at least twice in each year
according to the directions of the respective governing bodies
of the State. Dams may be erected, provided that suitable
floodgates and waterways allow free passage of the sand and
water so that the streams may be properly cleaned out and
adjacent lands properly drained. Such governing bodies are
empowered to require the building of floodgates and their
periodic opening when necessary.82 Obstruction of streams,
navigable rivers or harbors is subject to penalty.8 3 These
statutes do not specify whether they apply to both navigable
and non-navigable streams, but there would seem to be a
basic inconsistency in declaring all navigable streams to be
78. Id. at § 57-57, cited in Nathans v. Steinmeyer, 57 S. C. 386, 35 S. E.
733 (1900).
79. S. C. CONST., art. I, § 28. By statute, the owner of the shores or
of any wharf erected on the shores or in or over the waters of any nav-
igable stream may charge reasonable tolls for the use thereof. CODE OF
LAWs OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 70-163 (1952). See State v. Young, 30 S. C.
S99, 9 S. E. 355 (1899) involving indictment for nuisance for overcharg-
ing wharfage.
80. S. C. CONST., art. XIV, § 1. See State v. Young, supra, note 79.
81. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 70-1 (1952).
82. Id. at § 70-3.
83. Id. at §§ 70-2, 70-4.
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public highways, and then requiring private persons to keep
them clear.
An interesting case arose under these statutes where it
was held that a county was not liable for damages under a
1912 code section requiring county road commissioners to
keep "all navigable streams, watercourses and cuts" in repair
at all times. Plaintiff was riding a lumber raft down a navi-
gable river at night when he was precipitated into the water
and made sick when the raft came in contact with the cable
of a county-operated ferry. The cable was on the surface
instead of being lowered to the bottom when the ferry was
not in use. The Court held that the injury was not an in-
jury which might be sued upon as a defect in a public high-
way, but should be abated as a nuisance, and the Court would
not hold a county liable in such a case as this "unless shut
up to it by the plain mandates of the General Assembly."8 4
By statute one may now sue a county for defect in a county-
operated ferry.85
D. Aids to Navigation and Other Grants of Tidelands
The Governor has been given authority to grant not more
than ten acres belonging to the State and covered by the
navigable waters of the United States for lighthouse, beacon
or other aid to navigation,8 6 provided that jurisdiction for
service of process be retained.8 7 Specific sites have been
granted for lighthouses;88 for forts;89 for military installa-
tions;90 for spoil disposal ;91 for improvement of inland navi-
gation;92 for jetties to channel currents;93 for a sanitorium;94
for national forest reserve; 95 for a national migratory bird
refuge (which includes much of the lands over which the
Cape Romaine controversy arose, with a reverter clause if
the land be no longer used for a migratory bird refuge and
84. Speights v. Colleton County, 100 S. C. 304, 84 S. E. 873 (1915).
85. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 33-921 (1952).
86. Id. at § 39-71.
87. Id. at § 39-72.
88. Id. at §§ 39-102, 39-103, 39-106. See also §§ 39-113, 39-116, 39-119,
39-128.
89 Id. at §§ 39-114, 39-123, 39-124, 39-134.
90. Id. at §§ 39-110, 39-111, 39-117.
91. Id. at § 39-124.1.
92. Id. at 39-108, 39-109, 39-118.
93. Id. at §§ 39-120, 39-130, 39-134 (12).
94. Id. at § 39-122.
95. Id. at § 39-91.
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subject to rights to serve process and to rights of the State
Board of Fisheries) ;9( and for other purposes.9 7 Not all of
these statutes specify marshlands as such, but some of them
do.
E. Intracoastal Waterway
In addition08 the Governor and Secretary of State were
authorized to issue to the United States grant or grants of
perpetual right and easement for the present Intracoastal
Waterway, for canal prism, anchorage areas, turning basins
and their slopes and berms,99 in all land, including all sub-
merged lands "insofar as such lands are subject to grant by
the State . ." If title to any part of the lands "including
submerged lands" be in any private person, the State
Research, Planning and Development Board were empowered
to purchase the above described rights of way and spoil dis-
posal areas,10 or to condemn the lands, 02 or the United
States might condemn, 0 3 and condemnation would not be
affected by any conveyance for a public use and need not be
declared to be for a purpose paramount to all other public
uses1 0 4 (although oyster leases might be condemned, 10 and
oyster lessees might be reimbursed for losses, any damages
incurred are to be paid by the dredging companies and not
by the State).100
F. Fish and Fishery
The General Assembly has declared that "the waters and
bottoms of the bays, rivers, creeks and marshes within the
State or within three miles of any point along low water-
mark on the coast, not previously granted, shall be a common
for the taking of fish, subject to regulation by the Legisla-
ture."107  "Bottoms" have been defined by statute as
all of the tide lands of the State covered by water when at
96. Id. at § 39-121.
97. Id. at § 39-134.
98. Id. at §§ 39-108, 39-109, 39-118.
99. A "berm" is a ledge at the bottom of a bank to catch earth that
may roll down, and/or to strengthen the bank. BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY
(4th ed. 1951).
100. CODE OF LAws OF SouTH CAROLINA §§ 70-251, 70-281 (1952).
101. Id. at §§ 70-254, 70-282.
102. Id. at §§ 70-255, 70-283.
103. Id. at §§ 70-256, 70-284.
104. Id. at §§ 70-257, 70-285 (1952).
105. Id. at § 70-260.
106. Id. at § 70-261.
107. Id. at § 28-754.
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the state of ordinary high tide, and extending to one foot
below ordinary low water mark.108 The South Carolina Wild-
life Resources Commission has power to lease such bot-
toms,109 which are defined by the statute as "oyster
beds," no future grant, lease or conveyance of which, ex-
cept special grant from the General Assembly, shall convey
"any private ownership or control of any fishing or fisheries
therein."" 0 The Commission may lease to any one party, up
to one thousand acres to be used for oyster culture for com-
mercial purposes for a period not exceeding five years and up
to four acres to all other persons for any purpose other than
for commercial use."' Such leases carry an option for renewal
for five additional years." 2 Previous leases have preference
and any person "owning highlands abutting upon tidewaters"
has preference in applying for lease of two acres of bottoms
adjacent to such highlands for planting of oysters within the
limits prescribed." 3
G. Budget and Control Board, and Secretary of State
By statute the Secretary of State has been directed to take
charge of all property of the State, care and custody of which
is not otherwise provided for by law; to hold such property
subject to the directions of the State Budget and Control
Board" 4 and to act as its agent in the lease or sale thereof
as for forfeited and vacant lands." 5 All vacant lands and
lands of the former land commissioners of the State are
subject to the directions of the Budget and Control Board,""
and it may negotiate leases of mineral rights of all lands and
waters belonging to the State. 1 It has exclusive charge of
phosphatic deposits "in the navigable streams and in the
marshes thereof""18 and charge over all mining therein," 9
108. Id. at § 28-752.
109. Id. at § 28-791.
110. Id. at § 28-791.
111. Id. at § 28-811.
112. Id. at § 28-811.
113. Id. at §§ 28-815, 28-812.1. Query, whether one owning highlands
and marshes with marshlands directly butting upon tidewaters, has any
preference?
114. For powers of the Board over vacant lands, see notes 71 and 72,
supra.
115. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 1-205 (1952).
116. Id. at § 1-357.
117. Id. at § 1-361.1.
118. Id. at § 1-364.
119. Id. at § 1-372.
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and it may grant license to dig or mine phosphates".. from
all the navigable streams, waters and marshes of the State
and also from such of the creeks, not navigable, lying therein
as may contain phosphatic rock and deposits belonging to
the State and not previously granted... 120 The Board may
inquire into and protect the interests of the State in any
phosphates "whether in the navigable waters of the State or
in land marshes or other territory owned or claimed by other
parties, and in the proceeds of any such mines .... ,,121
H. South Carolina State Ports Authority
The South Carolina State Ports Authority is an instrumen-
tality of the State for developing, maintaining and operating
the harbors of the State, namely, Charleston, Georgetown and
Port Royal. 22 Its jurisdiction extends "over the waters and
shores of such harbors or seaports and over that part of all
tributary streams flowing into such harbors or seaports in
which the tide ebbs and flows and . . . to the outer edge of
the outer bar at such harbors or seaports."'123 It has been
held that the Authority as an agency of the State is in a real
sense a part of the State shares its sovereignty, and has
duties of a governmental character. 24  It may construct
bridges, wharves, and causeways ;125 buy or condemn prop-
erty; 20 and the "power of eminent domain shall apply not
only as to all property of private persons or corporations
but also as to property already devoted to public use."' 2 7 It
is authorized, subject to all laws and regulations of the United
States with respect to navigable waters, to take, use and ex-
clusively occupy, for the purposes stated, "any areas of land
owned by the State and within the counties of Beaufort,
Charleston and Georgetown, not in use for State purposes,
including swamps and overflowed lands, bottoms of streams,
lakes, rivers, bays, the sea and arms thereof and other waters
of the State and the riparian rights thereto pertaining."
120. Id. at § 1-367.
121. Id. at § 1-365.
122. Id. at § 54-1, (enacted 1942 (42) Stat. 1535).
123. Id. at § 54-12.
124. S. C. State Ports Authority v. Seaboard Air Line R. R., 124 F.
Supp. 533 (1954).
125. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 54-14 (1952).
126. Id. at § 54-15.
127. Id. at § 54-15. In other words, it may pre-empt use of public
lands, even if devoted to other public uses. Query, whether this would
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When so taken, such areas are "granted to and shall be the
property of the Authority"; but "in case it shall be held by
any court of competent jurisdiction that there are any lands
owned by the State which may not be so granted, then the
provisions of this section shall continue in full force and ef-
fect as to all other lands owned by the State."'1 8 It may
transfer property to the United States, 129 have supervision
over all wharves in the port of Charleston, 30 fix the lines
along the bay and harbor of Charleston and the rivers and
creeks flowing therein within which riparian owners may
erect wharves,131 and issue permit for building such wharves
without which any wharf owner may be fined.132 The Author-
ity is also charged with preserving peace and good order in
the bay and harbor of Charleston and with protecting and
preserving said harbor rivers and creeks therein from injury
by deposit of ballast, creation of obstructions, etc., 13 and
may designate where material excavated by dredging in
Charleston harbor shall be deposited. 3 4
I. South Carolina Public Service Authority (Santee-Cooper).
In addition to its authority to lease mineral rights on its
lands other than phosphatic deposits'3 the South Carolina
Public Service Authority has statutory power to develop the
Cooper River, the Santee River and the Congaree River in
this State for intrastate, interstate and foreign commerce
and navigation; to reclaim and drain swampy and flooded
lands; to investigate, study and consider all undeveloped
power sites and navigation projects in the State; and to ac-
quire and/or develop the same as need may arise; 13 and to
condemn land, water, water rights, and riparian rights.3 7
It is a corporation, and as stated in the statute it is supposed
to be "completely owned by and to be operated for the bene-
fit of the people of South Carolina."' 38
128. Id. at § 54-17.
129. Id. at § 54-19.
130. Id. at § 54-31.
131. Id. at § 54-51.
132. Id. at §§ 54-52, 54-53.
133. Id. at § 54-123.
134. Id. at § 54-124.
135. Id. at § 1-361.
136. Id. at § 59-3.
137. Id. at § 59-5.
138. Id. at §§ 59-8, 59-9. See the case of Rice Hope Plantation
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J. Water Pollution Control Authority
The General Assembly has declared the public policy to
maintain "purity of the waters of the State" consistent with
public health and enjoyment of such waters, propagation and
protection of fish, shellfish and wildlife.139 The Water Pollu-
tion Control Authority may abate pollution and sewage, and
set standards for particular waters, and has set such stan-
dards for some tidal waters.140 It has been directed to make
a study as to need for changes in laws due to presence of
nuclear materials in the State.141 This body is likely to be-
come of ever increasing importance to the State, for the
practice of dumping raw sewage from large populations of
human beings into our rivers and harbors has polluted them
to the point where commercial oyster industry may be de-
prived of the use of many oyster bottoms.
K. State Highway Department
The State Highway Department, by statute under certain
cbnditions, may build a "dam, levee, or other facility for
controlling water, constructing ditches or waterways or doing
some other thing to control water..."142 It has authority to
bridge streams, both intrastate and between South Carolina




The governing bodies of the respective counties may con-
struct footpaths or bridges over streams, swamps and
marshes and along the highways of the county; 4 5 condemn
lands for securing gravel, clay, sand, stone and other material
for road building;140 build bridges;147 form bridge districts
with other counties;148 and condemn, under the process of
Article 9, Section 20, South Carolina Constitution, so as to
139. CoDE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 70-101-139 (1952).
140. RULES AND REGULATIONS of the WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
AUTHORITY, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1952); 1955 ACTS AND
JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1576; 1956 ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 3036-7;
1957 AcTs AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1532-3.
141. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 1-395 (1952).
142. Id. at § 33-167, § 33-168.
143. Id. at § 33-601.
144. Id. at § 33-605.
145. Id. at § 33-813.
146. Id. at § 33-831.
147. Id. at § 33-608.
148. Id. at § 33-609.
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acquire a right of way through any lands for inland water-
ways.1
4 9
Certain of the counties are authorized to coperate with the
Federal Government concerning beach erosion, 5 0 provided
there is no State agency qualified to deal with the United
States Government.
M. Cities
All cities in South Carolina having a population of 50,000
or more are authorized by statute, if located upon a navi-
gable stream, whether tidal or non-tidal, to establish a port
utility commission, with power to purchase or otherwise ac-
quire, within or without corporate limits, lands, water or
riparian rights and wharves, for use in aid of commerce and
for public use.151
When desiring to extend water front for public purposes,
such cities are empowered to acquire private property by con-
demnation in the manner of railroad companies upon pay-
meat of just compensation.152 When improvements make
necessary the filling of lowlands owned by private persons,
and such filling is to be done by excavation from the bed of
a stream bordering the water front, the lowlands may be
filled at the expense of the private owners. This expense
constitutes a lien on the lands so filled and is to be determined
on a per cubic foot basis.' 53 Such private owners may fill
up their lands at their own expense, and shall be entitled to
use the mud or soil in the bed of the river in front of such
land for the purpose of filling up this land in preference to
any other, to the extent necessary to fill such lands.5
4
N. Soil Conservation and Drainage Districts and other
Governmental Agencies
By statute, the drainage of swamps, the drainage of sur-
face water from agricultural lands and the reclamation of
tidal marshes is sometimes considered a public benefit and
149. Id. at § 70-164.
150. Id. at §§ 63-211, 14-1011 (4).
151. Id. at § 54-101.
152. Id. at § 59-561.
153. Id. at § 59-562.
154. Id. at § 59-563. Powers of condemnation were also given. §§
59-564, 59-565; but § 59-565 has been repealed by Act No. 225 of 1953.
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conducive to the public health, convenience, utility and
safety.'5r This statute and the following sections permit the
creation of levee or drainage districts with power to locate
and build levees, drains, canals, ditches, embankments, tide
gates and pumping plants for the purpose of drainage and
reclaiming wet swamps or overflowed lands.156
Similar districts may also be created under the 1920 Drainage
Act.'57
Soil conservation districts may perform work on public
lands,158 and erosion districts for beaches have been created 5 9
among other special authorities. 60 The written consent of
the South Carolina Public Service Commission is required
for a railroad to cross "navigable or tide waters."''
0. Conclusion
Those statutes dealing directly with ownership of marsh-
lands by citizens are discussed in the cases cited in the next
section of this article. Of the statutes dealing with the va-
cant, ungranted marshes of the State, no comment is neces-
sary, except to say that there appears to be an over-
lapping of authority among various agencies or departments
of the State Government. Some of the statutes do not apply
to marshlands which have been granted, while others do ap-
ply. Deciding which statutes would apply in a particular
instance would be of importance.
VIII. SOUTH CAROLINA DEcIsIONS
In the following section, an effort has been made to state,
both generally and as applied to tidelands, the principles of
law relating to grants, construction of grants, prescription,
riparian rights, and navigability of tidal streams. -62 When
marshlands per se or rights therein were involved, that fact
has been stated. 63
155. Id. at § 18-201.
156. Id. at § 18-211.
157. Id. at § 18-401.
158. Id. at § 63-54.
159. Id. at §§ 63-291, 65-325.
160. Id. at § 70-51, Act No. 784 of 1954.
161. Id. at § 58-992.
162. See general principles discussed in Woodbridge, Rights of the
States in their Natural Resources Particularly as applied to Water, 5
S. C. L. Q. 130 (1952), particularly pages 137-139.
163. See Appendix for list of marshland cases, which have been marked
by asterisk. (To be published with Section II of this article.)
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A. Law of Grants and Deeds
As we have seen, the right of the State to grant lands arose
by its succession as sovereign in the place and stead of the
Crown of England. 64 The Supreme Court has held that no
grant to the State from the King was necessary.16 5
1. State's Title
Prima facie, title to lands is in the State when she sets up
her claim. This prima facie title constitutes a presumption
in favor of the State until a grant from the sovereign be
proven. 66 This prima facie title has elsewhere been spoken
of as the sovereign's title paramount, bare assertion of which
is sufficient until grant be proven; but, after proof of a grant,
".... the state, like any other plaintiff, is bound to show that
it has regained the title, either by purchase or escheat, or in
some other way.'' 167
By a tideland grant title to real estate should pass as dis-
tinguished from a franchise to dig phosphates' 68 or a per-
petual and exclusive right to take shellfish.6 9 A legislative
act declaring tidelands to be a common for the City of
Charleston and vesting same in city council has been held a
"reservation" and not a grant, and, therefore, not binding
on later legislatures, while another act held city council to be
164. Supra, pp. 5-6 and notes 21, 22 and 25.
165. State v. Pinckney, 22 S. C. 484, 502, where the Court says, "We
do not see how the State could produce any paper title as to lands which,
as alleged, had never been granted, unless perhaps she had been re-
quired to produce the history of the revolution."
166. Supra, note 22.
167. State v. Evans, 33 S. C. 184, 11 S. E. 697, (1890).
168. State v. Coosaw Mining Company, 144 U. S. 550, 36 L. Ed. 537,
(1892), affirming 47 Fed. 225. (cir. ct. S. D. S. C. 1891).
169. Cape Romaine Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Can-
ning Co., 148 S. C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928). The Cape Romaine Land
and Improvement Company was the grantee from the Sinking Fund
Commission of a perpetual and exclusive right to take shellfish in the
tidelands in question, given by recorded deed pursuant to act of the Gen-
eral Assembly, 20 Stat. at Large 1097, deed dated Feb. 12, 1899, recorded
Book Z 22, page 479, R. M. C. Office for Charleston County. And see 5
S. C. L. Q. 138 (1952), wherein the author, Mr. Dudley W. Woodbridge,
Dean, Dept. of Jurisprudence, William and Mary College, says that, "to
the extent that a state owns in its public right it owns in trust for all
its citizens and can grant no monopoly," citing Commonwealth v. New-
port News, 158 Va. 521, 164 S. E. 689 (1932), wherein it was held the
Legislature might grant the jus privatum, including the soil, but might
not grant free from the rights of the public under jus publicum, and that
the jus publicum was what the Legislature said it was, so that the
Legislature might authorize the City of Newport News to dump raw
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"mere trustees" with power to improve and sell.' 7 0 Generally
speaking, a grant carries all that is necessary to its complete
enjoyment.'
7 '
2. Presumption of Validity; Contest
It has often been held that the courts will not question
the validity of a grant which appears regular and legal on
its face,17 2 but such is presumed valid, the burden of proof
being upon him who contests validity; and a grant may not
be avoided in a collateral proceeding. 7 3 Although the manner
of granting differed from time to time, depending upon stat-
utory law or authorized regulation then obtaining, the man-
ner of obtaining grant has been discussed in South Carolina
cases. 17 4 A grant cannot be revoked except by some legal
proceeding, because the holder or owner may be able to show
why it is good; 17 5 but it may be assailed as being upon its
face absolutely void as to all the world, where the State had
no title to grant, or the officer had no authority to sign it.
T6
Before issue of a grant, the granting process might be
stopped by caveat to prevent issue, but the court of caveat
had no power after a grant had issued.17 7 In the event that
more than one grant issued on the same property, the second
is a grant merely void, carrying nothing, and is not any more
color of title or evidence of the extent of a possession than
would be a deed or survey accompanied by claim." 8 The
younger grant cannot be considered as any evidence of the
revocation of the elder, but the elder remains in full force,1 9
and a surveyor is estopped from making survey of lands al-
ready granted. 8 0
170. West End Dev. Co. v. Thomas, 92 S. C. 229, 75 S. E. 450 (1912).
171. State v. McGowen, 1 N. & McC. 387 (1818).
172. Frampton v. Wheat, 27 S. C. 288, 3 S. E. 462 (1887).
173. Id. at 464-65; contra, Cape Romaine, supra note 169.
174. Barker v. Deignan, 25 S. C. 252 (1886); Frampton v. Wheat, 27
S. C. 288, 3 S. E. at 462, (1887).
175. Duncan v. Beard, 2 N. & McC. 400 (1820) wherein the Constitu-
tional Court says: "Despotic indeed would be that government which
would exercise the power of revoking at will, all grants of land which it
may have made to individuals, or of determining, without the intervention
of a judicial tribunal, where there was ground for a revocation."
176. Frampton v. Wheat, 27 S. C. 288, 3 S. E. 462 (1887).
177. Trapier v. Wilson, 2 McCord L. 191 (1822); Nichols v. Hubbard,
5 Rich. L. 267 (1851).
178. Nichols v. Hubbard, 5 Rich. L. 267 at 272 (1851).
179. Duncan v. Beard, 2 N. & McC. 400 (1820).
180. Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co., 42 S. C. 138, 19 S. E. 963 (1894).
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3. Surveys, Acreage and Boundaries
It was a statutory requirement of issuing grants in time
past, even as far back as the days of the Lords Proprietors,' 8 '
that surveyors lay out vacant lands four chains back from
"all creeks and rivers navigable for shipping or boats" for
every one chain along such rivers. 8 2 With reference to this
act, two cases have upheld marshland grantsMsa In the
Frampton case, the Court declared that a presumption exists
that the officers had done their duty, and had properly lo-
cated the lands, and the presumption would have to be re-
butted. It held that the survey statute was complied with,
unless 4t be proven that added vacant lands lay back of this
survey.1
8 4
In the case of Shoolbred v. Vanderhorst,115 involving an
error in the original survey of the grant, an early grant re-
ferred to Kiawah River as a boundary, and to certain bluffs
as situate on said river. Resurvey established that both could
not be correct and that the bluffs would have to be abandoned
as a boundary in order for the grant to carry out to the river.
The Constitutional Court found that a small creek near the
bluffs had apparently been mistaken for the Kiawah River
itself, and that the natural points (the bluffs), noted in grant
and plat, confined the grant thereto, even though another
natural boundary (Kiawah River) was called a boundary in
the plat of the grant, because the surveyor had not gone to
the river-and the Court established a small mud creek near
the bluffs as the correct boundary.
181. See, for example, SALLEY, WARRANTS FOR LANDS IN S. C. 1672-1679,
p. 4 (five chains for one).
182. 4 Stat. 592.
183. Frampton v. Wheat supra note 176; Chamberlain v. Northeastern
Ry., 41 S. C. 399, 19 S. E. 743 (1894).
184 ..... To make out the allegation so as to overthrow the grant, it
seems to us that it was necessary to prove affirmatively at least
two things: First, that the surveyor did not locate the land as
required by the section aforesaid; and, Second, that there were
sufficient vacant lands adjacent to the survey to make practicable
a compliance with the provision, which manifestly contemplated
vacant lands sufficient for that purpose, lying back of the survey.
Unless there was such vacant land back of this survey, we think
it was not a case for the application of the rule of the section;
otherwise, there might be an isolated piece of vacant land lying
on a stream, which could never be located or granted; and we
suppose that such could not have been the intention of any part
of an act, the preamble of which declared that 'the granting of
the vacant lands of this state will be greatly conducive to its
strength and prosperity, by increasing the agriculture and popula-
tion there of.' Frampton v. Wheat, 27 S. C. 288, 3 S. E. 462 (1887).
185. 1 Brev. 315 (1804).
19621
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With regard to defective acreage on a plat showing a
shortage, it has been held as a general rule, that where a
person sells land by the metes and bounds of an original
grant, even though the lines be in a different manner than
contemplated or contain less than it purports to contain, the
buyer has no complaint and no recourse upon the seller be-
cause every person accepts a grant upon the faith of the
public and not of the grantee.180 In a case where one, before
purchasing, directed a survey to embrace only land not
covered by water of the Catawba River, but later held to
mid-stream, even corner trees marked on the river bank can-
not prevent his holding to mid-stream when the river at the
time of the grant was found by the jury to have been non-
navigable;1 8 7 and where a river is shown on a plat as an open
line, that makes the river a boundary and carries the line
to the center of the stream.1 8
It has been held that, as to a non-tidal river, not navigable
but capable of improvement for navigation, the right of the
public to use for navigation and fishery did not impair the
right of the individual to the soil and to use of the waters
consistent with the rights of the public, and such possible
future navigability of the river did not constitute partial
failure of consideration as to the portion of land under water,
because defendant purchased by certain metes and bounds,
and is entitled to all therein. 89
In the case of Trapier v. Wilson'9" plaintiff asked for a
caveat to prevent grant to defendant of some 500 acres of
land on North Island, claimed to be already owned by plain-
tiff. An issue was made as to whether the 500 acre tract
was vacant (hence, ungranted) land, and survey was made to
determine the extent and location of previous grant. At
186. Bond v. Quattlebaum, 1 McCord 584 (1822).
187. McCollough v. Wall, 4 Rich. 68 (1850).
188. Noble v. Cunningham, McMul. Eq. 289 (1841), wherein the court
says at page 295: This is the common method by which a stream
is called for as boundary; and we see no evidence of any special
design to exclude any part of the river from the tract; and where
the common method of making a river a boundary has been pur-
sued, as in this case, we must conclude that the design was not to
exclude, but to include, the land to the centre or line of the river.
The apparent hardship of being compelled to pay for the water,
will be obviated when it is considered that the principle upon
which the decision is made, is the only one which secures to the
owner all the advantages of the streams contiguous to his lands,
for mills, or other machinery, and for fish.
189. Executors of Cates v. Wadlington, 1 McCord 579 (1822).
190. 2 McCord 191 (1822).
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trial (which, against defendant's objections, was by jury),
the plaintiff produced the grant under which he claimed
wherein~the premises he claimed were described as bounded
"..... to the Westward on salt-water marsh partly, and
partly on a creek, and south-westward on Winyaw River or
Bay, and to the eastward on the sea, and to the northward
on a place called the basin, near North Inlet."
The jury found that there was no vacant land, whereupon
caveat issued, and on appeal, defendant's motion for new
trial was refused. The question was whether the grant in
plaintiff's chain of title should be limited to the acreage there-
in expressed, or, the natural stations or corners of the plat
not being located, whether the "whole island" within the ex-
pressed boundaries should be deemed to pass by the grant.
The contention seems to have been mainly over the more valu-
able highlands and the marshlands came in because de-
fendant claimed that the grant in plaintiff's chain of title
included "all down to low water marsh" [sic] as well as high
land, thus using all the acreage in the grant and leaving some
high land acreage vacant and available to grant to defendant.
The Court held that the fact that the finding of surplus
acreage within the bounds of the granted lands was of little
consequence, for "... the quantity of land is whatever is con-
tained within the true boundaries" ;191 but the opinion did not
clearly include marshlands per se or ea nomine, because it
stated elsewhere, "The whole island, (unless the marsh be so
called) [sic] is clearly within . . ." the description of the
grant.192
191. Id. at 198..... The plat too is marked thus, 'The North Island
by a scale of 40.' Why use the comprehensive name of the 'North
Island', if a part only were intended to be delineated? The certif-
icate of the surveyor also describes the land as being a place called
'North Island,' etc. Again, I ask, why this comprehensive term
'a place', unless in order to signify the whole. 'The Island,' or the
'place' means the whole island or place ..... The plat and grant
appear then easily reconciled... . . Where there is no station or
corner found, it becomes absolutely necessary to resort to bound-
aries, and even to the boundaries of surrounding lands, in order
to locate the tract calling for them. . ... Assuredly, surplus land
being found, is of little consequence; for the quantity of land is
whatever is contained within the true boundaries; and the end of
the location is to fix the boundaries, which being done, the quantity
follows, being the contents within them. The notice in the plat of
the number of acres is in fact but an expression in the general
description, and is very seldom put down with accuracy ....
192. Id., at 196. Later, this case was interpreted as not deciding the
sufficiency of a grant, but as turning upon questions of location. Nichols
v. Hubbard supra, note 177. For recent opinion of the Attorney General
1962]
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It has been held that an island in Beaufort County was
enclosed within the meaning of the fence act of 1827. This act
constituted a deep, navigable stream the equivalent of a fence
so that plaintiff was entitled to recover in an action of tres-
pass quare citusum fregit for unauthorized hunting there-
on. 103 Marshland as such was not mentioned in this case.
It was clearly held in the Pinckney case that a conveyance
by the United States Direct Tax Commission'94 of an island
in Beaufort County of the highland acreage, but reciting the
boundaries of the navigable streams surrounding both the
high and the marshland acreage thereof, carried only title to
the highlands, save for one tract of marshland which the
State had expressly granted.195 The Cape Romaine case
stated that, despite a surveyor's note that one boundary was
at low water mark on Bull's Bay, "in the case of a tidal
navigable stream, the boundary line is high-water mark, in
the absence of more specific language showing that it was
intended to go below high-water mark, and the portion of
land between high and low water mark remains in the state
in trust for the benefit of the public interest. .. "19s The
Rice Hope case specifically repeated the above excerpt from
the Romaine case.
10
4. Proof, Boundaries or Extent, and Validity
It has been held that proof of a plat of a grant (to marsh-
lands) fails if there is no proof of the grant itself.'9 8
Entirely apart from any statutory designations of low
water mark, 190 the courts have drawn a dividing line at low
water mark on the banks of tidal navigable streams.2 00 Be-
low mean low water mark lie the beds of the said tidal nay-
that "marsh island" does not mean "marsh," see 1959 House Journal, p.
860, opinion dated April 10, 1959. See also Cape Romaine case, supra.
193. Fripp v. Hasell, 1 Strob. 173 (1846).
194. This commission was created under a punitive measure of the
"Reconstruction" era, entitled, "An Act for the collection of direct taxes
in the insurrectionary districts within the United States, and for other
purposes." 12 U. S. Statutes, Section 14, p. 425.
195. State v. Pinckney, 22 S. C. 484 at 492 and at 510-511 (1884).
196. Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Can-
ning Co., 148 S. C. 428, at 434, 146 S. E. 434, at 436 (1928).
197. Rice Hope Plantation v. S. C. S. P. A., 216 S. C. 500, at 530, 59
S. E. 2d 132, at 145 (1956).
198. South Carolina R. R. v. Toomer, 9 Rich. Eq., 270 (1856), Barker
v. Deignan, 25 S. C. 252 (1886).
199. Supra, note 108.
200. State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. 50, at 83, 84 (1884).
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igable streams, which have been held to be the property of
the State, subject to the jus publicum, not subject to grant
save by special act of the Legislature, and held in trust for
the public uses of navigation and fishery.201 However, the
principle has been recognized that the beds of non-navigable.
tidal streams or creeks have been the subject of grant.
20
2
There have been many cases in which particular grants to,
marshlands have been specifically proven and upheld, being-
directly in issue,203 and several where grants were held not.
proven.204
There seems to be a conflict of authority on the question,,
whether a grant of marshlands butting on navigable streams.
carried the marsh or whether the highwater mark is thez
boundary, three cases apparently holding that the usual rule.
(that a grant carries all within its bounds) does not ap-
ply; 20 5 while the Oakc Point Mines case2°6 and the Farmers'
'Mining Company case2 °7 appear to apply the usual rule.
201. Ibid.: State v. Oak Point Mines, 22 S. C. 593 (1884); Chisolm v.
Caines, 67 Fed. 285 (cir ct. D. S. C. 1894) Heyward v. Farmers' Mining:
Co., 42 S. 0. 138, 19 S. E. 963 (1894).
The requirement that title to river beds, as public highways, be
vested in the State is at variance with the ordinary rule as to land high-
ways, title to the sof under which remains in the land-owner subject to
the easement or servitude of the public, unless fee has passed by deed
to the public or by condemnation.
The necessity of vesting titles to beds of navigable streams, in the
State in order to preserve free navigation ". . loses sight of the fact
that if the land was in the riparian owner, it would be subject to all the
regulations which would be necessary to preserve it for the public use,
and that for hundreds of years during which the beds of rivers of Eng-
land have been in private ownership the public right therein has in no
way been impaired.. ." ROGERS, Title to Subaqueous Lands in Alabama,
11 Axa. L. REv. 273, n. 45 (1959), quoting 1 FARNHAM, WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 53.
202. State v. Pacific Guano, 22 S. C. 50, 79 (1884); Heyward v. Far-
mers' Mining Co., supra; Chisolm v. Caines, supra.
203. Chisolm v. Caines, supra; State v. Pinckney, supra; State v. Oak
Point Mines, supra; South Carolina R. R. v. Toomer, supra; Frampton
v. Wheat, supra; Gadsden v. West Shore Inv. Co., 99 S. C. 172, 82 S. E.
1052 (1914); West End Dev. Co. v. Thomas, 92 S. C. 229, 75 S. E. 450)
(1912); Nathans v. Steinmeyer, 57 S. C. 386, 35 S. E. 733 (1900).
204. Cape Romaine Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina Can-
ning Co., supra, note 169; State v. Pinckney, supra, note 165; Barker v.
Deignan, 25 S. C. 252 (1836).
205. State v. Pinckney, supra note 165, held that a grant of lands
bounding upon rivers and vacant marsh does not carry such marshes
as it bounds upon, and Cape Romaine -followed by Rice Hope stated the
same rule.
206. State v. Oak Point Mines 22 S. C. 593 (1884).
207. Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co. 42 S. C. 138, 19 S. E. 963 (1894).
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L B. Title by Prescription, Possession or, Usage.20
r 1. Against the State
It has been stated that the State may lose its title to lands
Pby charter or grant, and also by prescription or usage.20 9
-Against the State, the applicable period is twenty years, as
,the statute provides that the State will not sue unless within
7that period the right or title accrue or the State shall have
:received the rents and profits from the land or some part
ithereof. 210 This statute is a vast change from the common
law, the rule of which was nuUum tempus occurrit regi -no
time runs against the king. The common law doctrine has
been held in a marshland case to have been the rule in South
Carolina until 1870,211 the forty year statutory period then
created having been later changed to a twenty year period in
1873.212 Although title by prescription was alleged in both
the Pacific Guano and the Farmers' Mining Co. cases, in
umeither was it a decisive factor, as it was held in both cases
that the necessary time had not run and the statute of limi-
tations did not apply. However, the South Carolina Supreme
Court plainly has held, "If the plaintiff can trace title back
to a grant from the state' to land covered by tidal, though
not navigable waters, the state would be estopped by its
grant. -"213 In the Oak Point Mines case, the opinion of the
-circuit court stated that possession for the statutory period
Taises the presumption of a grant co-extensive with the
Tmits of such possession, as to marshlands, but not as to
the beds below low water mark of tidal navigable streams.21 4
208. Properly speaking, "prescription" relates to acquiring title to in.
corporeal hereditaments by long and continued enjoyment, while adverse
possession applies to land itself. BLACK, LAW DiCTIONARY, (4th ed. 1951).
"Usage" is defined as a reasonable and lawful public custom in a local-
ity concerning particular transactions which is so well established and
uniform as to be known or is presumed to be known. BLACK, LAW Dic-
TIONARY, (4th ed. 1951). These words have all been used as to titles in
marshlands in South Carolina, more or less interchangeably, to indicate
an estoppel against a former owner, to assert title.
209. Supra, text, page 9, and note 32.
210. CODE Op LAWS OF SouTH CAIOLinA § 10-121 (1952).
211. State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S. C. 50, at 83 (1884).
212. Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co., 42 S. C. 138, 19 S. E. 963 (1894).
213. Id. at 973.
214. These citations from our statutes are, to my mind, conclusive of
the question under consideration. They show unmistakably that
lands below high water mark in tidal navigable rivers have been
uniformly recognized by the legislature as embraced within the
description of vacant lands, and subject as such to location and
grant under the general regulations of the land office. This
[Vol. 14
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Although the matter was not decided, because the statutory
period had not elapsed, the Court in the Pacific Guano case
questioned whether constructive possession of the beds of nav-
igable streams could be maintained against the trust of the
State for the people.
2 15
2. Against Private Owners
Actual possession for ten years under written instrument
or twenty years statutory possession have been deemed suf-
ficient as to reclaimed marshlands. 216
It has been held that one obstructing a cut dug between
two navigable streams through his unenclosed marshlands
was not entitled to maintain an action of trespass for the
removal of the obstructions by members of the public, who
had'been using the cut as a waterway for thirty-five years,
despite fears of plaintiff that the cut would admit salt
practical interpretation of its own language by the legislature,
being in accordance with the comprehensive meaning which it bears
in law, there would seem to be an end to the question whether a
grant of land to low water 'mark in the bed of a tidal navigable
stream, issued in conformity to the provisions of the act of 1791,
passed the title of the state to the grantor.
My conclusion is that defendants have valid title, under the grant
of 1869 to Henry M. Stuart (from whom they derived), to the
soil between ordinary high water and low water mark in said
creek, embraced within the lines of said grant. As to the title to
the bed of the creek below ordinary low water mark, I hold that it
is in the state. No express grant conveying this land has been
produced. No long-continued acts of ownership in the bed of the
creek have been shown in support of a prescriptive right. AngeU
on Tide Waters, 96; Tyler on Boundaries, 36.
The Possession for forty years of the adjacent land by those under
whom defendants claim undoubtly raises the presumption of a
grant co-extensive with the limits of such possession. But to ex-
tend the boundary to the centre of the creek would be to over-
turn an established rule of the common law which has never yet
been questioned by any court in England or this country. The
tendency of American decisions has been to restrict riparian
proprietorship even upon navigable rivers above the tides, and
not to enlarge it in respect to navigable streams in which the tide
ebbs and flows. Whenever the common law test of navigability
has been repudiated, the common law consequences of navigability
have been held to attach. Nothing more can be claimed under the
grant presumed from the possession of the upland than would re-
sult from an express grant calling for the creek as a boundary,
conceding that usage would carry the line to the low water mark,
the principle on which it could be extended further upon the facts
of this case is not to be found in the common law, nor in any de-
cision that has come within my notice. 22 S. C. 593 at 601-602
(1884). (Italics added.)
215. 22 S. C. at 82-84.
216. Intendant & Wardens of Port Royal v. C & W. C. Ry., 136 S. C.
525, 134 S. E. 497 (1926). (See syllabus 7).
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water into his rice fields.217 The basis of the decision seems
to have been that the mashlands were surrounded by naviga-
ble streams, and therefore were sufficiently enclosed under
the fence act to support adverse user, and were not entitled
to the presumption against adverse user of unenclosed
lands.218 The trial judge was dissatisfied with the result
and Justice Munro dissented from the affirming decision
on appeal, on the ground that the jury verdict appropriated
private property to the public use and abandoned it to "the
lawless rapacity of squatter sovereignty."
In the case of Charleston Rice Milling Co. v. Bennett
2 19
defendants owned a rice mill on Cooper River in Charles-
ton, and later plaintiffs established a mill. Both mills were
between the low-water mark and the edge of the marsh
of Cooper River, and both traced to a common source of
title in which there was a partition plat showing a canal
along the northern side of the premises as far east as a
proposed street known as Concord Street, but not extending
past Concord Street to the channel of Cooper River. Defend-
ant's lands were between the proposed Concord Street and
Cooper River, and the partition plat showed no canal along
the north side thereof. However, a later plat in the common
chain showed the canal running along plaintiffs' lands,
beyond the proposed line of Concord Street and along de-
fendants' lands to the channel of Cooper River, and this
enlarged canal bore this legend, "Canal in Common, now
twenty feet wide to the channel."
The site for Concord Street had never been filled at this
place, but remained in its original state as mud or water. The
common grantors in both chains of title in 1834 conveyed
to defendants' predecessor in title, "all that tide lot . . .
bounded to the North on land laid out as a canal," and in
1849 they conveyed to plaintiffs' predecessor in title, "all
that water lot . . . butting and bounding to the North, on
a canal twenty feet wide, laid out for use in common of
sundry heirs and assigns.. ." of the common grantors.
The case turned on two questions, whether the canal ever
extended east of Concord Street through or along lands of
defendants to the channel of Cooper River, and if so, whether
defendants obstructed it.
217. Heyward v. Chisolm, 11 Rich. L. 253 (1858).
218. See Fripp v. Hasell, supra note 193.
219. 18 S. C. 254 (1882).
[Vol. 14324
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The jury found for plaintiffs, and the verdict was sustained
on. appeal. The Court upheld a charge that there was in-
sufficient evidence of user of the canal along the exact lines
thereof to establish a prescriptive right to its use, or to
the water within the lines of the canal, because the canal
through the lot of defendants was . . . under an open sheet
of water and not appearing on the surface," and also because
there was no exception to this charge. The Court also held
that the right to use the canal was a private right resting
upon grant, and was a covenant running with the land, and
there was no question of dedication to or acceptance by the
public. The Court held that defendants were estopped to
deny the canal across the northern boundary of their lot,
and that the possible future filling of Concord Street so as
to cut across the canal would not defeat plaintiffs' right to
use the canal, because the laying out and dedication of the
street did not divest plaintiffs of title, but only subjected
the land to the easement.
3. Possession of Tidelands
It has been held that possession of marshland is presumed
to be in him who has the right or title,2 20 and, conversely,
that title to marshland is assumed to be in the party in
possession.2 2 1 Actual possession for ten years under written
instrument, or statutory possession for twenty years has
been deemed sufficient.2 22  Constructive possession may not
be presumed against the grant of marshlands or one claim-
ing thereunder or in favor of one not claiming under grant,
unless actual adverse possession has been within the limits
of the grant.2 2 3
The difference between actual and constructive possession
has been discussed in a marshlands case.224 In the Steinmeyer
220. South Carolina R. R. v. Toomer 9 Rich. Eq. 270 at 274 (1857).
221. Chisolm v. Caines, 67 Fed. 285 at 287 (1895).
222. Intendant & Wardens of Port Royal v. C. & W. C. Ry., supra note
216.
223. South Carolina R. R. v. Toomer, 9 Rich. Eq. 270 at 273 (1857).
224. "... . The 'possession of property' is a relative term. It is actually
in your personal possession when it is in your immediate presence
and control. It is constructively in your possession when you have
the title thereto, and no one else is in actual possession against
your will, or under a claim hostile to you. In this case these lots
could only be possessed in a certain way and to a limited extent;
that is to say, for such purposes as they were capable of being uti-
lized by the owner, or person who claimed to be owner. J. H. Stein-
meyer knew for what purpose these water lots could be used, and
1962]
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case plaintiff sued to foreclose a mortgage on lands bounded
by Wentworth Street extended, Gadsden, Beaufain and Barre
Streets in the City of Charleston, and certain defendants
answered and set up failure of consideration on the ground
of paramount title in the City of Charleston by virtue of
7 Stat. at Large 151 (1836), by which act the General As-
sembly vested certain marshlands and mud flats in the
City.22 1 The particular lands in question were part of lands
granted by the Lords Proprietors to John Comings in 1675,
and had passed through partition proceedings of Harleston
v. Harleston, in 1770, the plat showing these lands having
been adopted by the Court in said partition case and the
boundaries under the Harleston chain of title having been
recognized in the plat annexed to the act aforesaid. De-
fendants contended that the Comings grant226 carried only
to high water mark, on the authority of the Pinckney and
Pacific Guano cases, supra, but admitted that the State could
grant marshlands, on the authority of Heyward v. Farmers'
Mining Company, supra.
The Plaintiffs contended that the possession of the Harle-
stuns came within the provisions of present Section 57-57,
1952 Code, Act of 1787, providing that actual possession
of lands five years prior to July 4, 1776, should be deemed
good title, and, therefore, that the State recognized the
title by the said act, and estopped itself from claiming the
water lots in question and admitted the title of the Harlestons.
Defendants had never been evicted from the possession of
the water lots; nor had the State, the City of Charleston,
nor any one at all ever questioned or in any way disturbed
that possession.
22 7
he knew the nature of the possession in which they could be and
were held. He got the possession for which he bargained, and held
it until he sold it. He considered it actual possession when he pur-
chased and while he held these flats; and, according to his own
testimony, he sold these flats, which of course, included his right
of possession, for full value. I do not think that he can now ques-
tion that possession,-certainly not in this case. Under the deed
from the executors he got and held everything that deed calls for,
and his grantees now enjoy the property. Under the circumstances
of this case, the usual presumption that possession follows the title
should be applied to the defendants and their title . . ." Nathans
v. Stelnmeyer, 57 S. C. 386, 35 S. E. 733, 736 (1900). (Italics
added).
225. See text, p. 7.
226. Discussed in State v. Duncan, 1 McCord L. 403 (1821).
227. Nathans v. Steinmeyer, 57 S. C. 386, 35 S. E. 733 (1900).
[Vol. 14
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It appeared that defendant's father conducted a sawmill
on the premises, using the water lots or mud flats as a pondc
for the storage of lumber, the lot being staked off and not
used except by permission. Storage was collected from per-
sons storing lumber there, and a portion of the mud flat
was filled in, unmolested. The lower court stated that de-
fendant knew from actual knowledge the nature of the lots,
and of what possession they were capable.
The lower court concluded that plaintiffs had nothing to
do with the mistake of title (on defendant's part), which
the latter at first thought to go to low water mark, but
later thought carried only to the high water mark; and the
Supreme Court affirmed, specifically holding that the con-
clusions of the lower court were sustained by the authorities
cited, and reversed only the appointment of a receiver.228
On the crucial question of paramount title, the Supreme
Court said:
We regard the law as settled in this state that nei-
ther partial nor total failure of consideration can
be set up as defense on account of a paramount outstand-
ing title, before eviction, and therefore see no practical
benefit to be derived from commenting on the numerous
cases, or tracing the history of this question, which has
caused so much trouble, by reason of the fact that the
courts of law and equity heretofore entertained different
views upon the subject .. .229
As to the extent of possession that one may have in sub-
merged lands, the Court said in the Steinmeyer case that
marsh land lots "could only be possessed in a certain way
and to limited extent; that is to say, for such purposes as
they were capable of being utilized by the owner . .. 280
In Barker v. Deignan,231 plaintiff's action for trespass and
damages was met with claim of paramount title under grant
in defendant, plus adverse possession. The property was a
small lot covered with water, part of the Cleland grant,
but defendant made the mistake of introducing only the plat
thereof, which was later excluded for failure to prove the
228. Ibid.
229. Id. at 738-739.
230. Supra, note 224.
231. 25 S. C. 252 (1886).
1962] 32T
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.grant in proper form, thus leaving defendant without color of
title, and dependent upon claim of physical possession.
Possession was held a jury question, and the verdict of the
.jury that defendant did not have possession was affirmed on
.appeal. In Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co.,2 3 2 the lower
,court holding that plaintiff was in possession and did not have
to prove title was reversed on the ground that one claiming
fee simple title to marshlands should prove the grant where
the State was a party. The lower court had held that plain-
tiff's possession had been "such as this marsh land was cap-
able of, and therefore sufficient. '23 In Lynak v. United
States,234 the federal circuit court found that "plaintiffs and
their ancestors had been in the actual, exclusive, pedis posses-
sio of all this land - high land and rice land - down to the
embankment of the river at low-water mark, holding under
a grant from the English Crown. This long-continued actual,
adverse possession would give a complete title as against
the world. 2 35
It has been held that marshlands are the subject of levy
and sale for non-payment of taxes. 236  In Gadsden v. West
Shore Investment Co.230a defendant was refused specific
-performance because a link in the chain of title was a tax
deed. The lands in question were granted by the Crown in
1742, and were later divided into two tracts, aggregating
forty-four acres, adjoining, but without evidence of any
dividing line between them. The Legislature in 1889 au-
thorized the sinking fund commissioners to survey any
lands which were on neither the tax duplicates nor the
forfeited land list for ten or more continuous years and
if on survey, such lands be found absent, to place them on
the tax books in the owner's name, if known, and if not,
in the name of "Unknown." In 1890 the two tracts were
put on the tax books as "Unknown Ashley River, 44 acres
assessed $100.00 from 1885"; and in 1890 the land was sold
by Ferguson, Sheriff, and bid in by Gadsden, Administrator.
232. Supra, note 212, at 148, 19 S. E. at 969.
233. Id. at 148, 19 S. E. at 966.
234. 188 U. S. 445, 47 L. Ed. 539 (1902), affirming 106 Fed. 121 (cir.
ct. D. S. C. 1901); See also, Williams v. United States, 188 U. S. 485, 47
L. Ed. 554 (1903), affirming 104 Fed. 50 (cir. et. D. S. C. 1900).
235. Lynah v. United States 106 Fed. 121, at 122. (1901).
236. Chamberlain v. Northeastern Ry., 41 S. C. 399, 19 S. E. 743
(1894); Gadsden v. West Shore Investment Co., 99 S. C. 172, 82 S. E.
1052 (1914).
236a. 99 S. C. 172,82 S. E. 1052 (1914).
.128 [Vol. 14
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On June 6, 1913, Sheriff Martin, successor to Ferguson, gave
a deed to Gadsden.
The Court held that the sheriff was presumed to have
taken possession in 1890, and that a tax title under South
Carolina statutes is presumed to be good, the burden being
upon him who alleges defect, and affirmed for plaintiff.
Payment of taxes was held no evidence of title, but failure
to pay was held evidence that no claim was made.
237
An unfavorable result arose in the Pinckney case,238 which
might be said to have involved non-payment of taxes to
the United States Direct Tax Commission.
. Acts of possession of tidelands which have come before
the courts include renting the right to cut marshes, 239 em-
bankment and planting of rice lands,240 leasing of premises
for hunting,241 floating rafts and lumber and staking same
to ground under water,242 placing sawmill and staking lot,
storage of lumber in pond on lot and not admitting tres-
passers, 243 taking oysters, posting, and burning oyster shell
to make lime for cement.244
While the cases cited245 (concerning reclaimed marshlands
used for rice fields) necessarily involved the reclamation of
marshlands by embankment, one case has arisen wherein
237. Id., at 180, 82 S. E. at 1053.
It is said that there could be no actual possession of this marsh
land. In that case, the defaulting taxpayer had no actual posses-
sion. In 1890 the tax officials put this land on the tax books as
land upon which taxes had not been paid in ten or more years.
The payment of taxes is not evidence of title as is supposed in
popular myth, but the failure to pay is evidence that no claim was
made. We have then that for thirty-three years neither Guignard
nor Lucas nor their heirs have made any claim to the land. There
is a presumption that Sheriff Ferguson took possession in 1890.
There is no evidence of a change in the status, except that Sheriff
Martin put Norman Gadsden in possession in 1913 and made the
deed as he was authorized to do. The statute authorizes the suc-
ceeding sheriff to make the deed, and there is no limit in the stat-
ute. (Italics added).
238. Supra, note 193.
239. Frampton v. Wheat, supra, note 203.
240. Lynah v. United States and Williams v. United States, supra,
note 234.
241. Chisohn v. Caines, 67 Fed. 285 (cir. ct. D. S. C. 1894).
242. Barker v. Deignan, supra, note 231.
243. Nathans v. Steinmeyer, supra, note 224.
244. Cape Romaine Land Improvement Co., supra, note 204; and see
Aiston v. Limehouse, 60 S. C. 559, 39 S. E. 188 (1901) and Donaldson
v. Nesbit, 60 S. C. 570, 39 S. E. 967 (1901); Brown v. United States,
81 Fed. 55 (cir. ct. E. D. Va. 1897); Richardson v. United States, 100
Fed. 714 (cir. ct. E. D. Va. 1900).
245. Supra, note 234.
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a town claimed title to a deposit of oyster shells, and sued
the defendant railroad for trespass for alleged intent to
remove the shells.2 46 In the Port Royal case defendant al-
eged title for more than thirty years; the lower court
directed a nonsuit, and plaintiff appealed, specifically alleg-
ing that ownership to lands below high water mark is pre-
sumed to be in the public in the absence of statute, and the
town had a right to prevent trespass if defendant showed
no better right; that title to lands on tidewater does not
extend below high-water mark; and that the town was in
exclusive possession of the shell deposits, and, therefore, of
the lands underneath. The Court held that the town was
not entitled to show its tax books or its purchase at its own
tax sale, and affirmed the holding that plaintiff had not
shown exclusive possession of the lands; and, as plaintiff
had not shown title either by deed or title of adjoining
highlands so as to claim alluvion soil, non-suit was proper,
leaving both parties where they were, with leave to file
subsequent suit if so minded. In reaching this conclusion,
written title and possession for ten years, or twenty years
statutory possession of the tidelands were stated as the
alternatives to proof of ownership of the adjoining high
land, ownership of which was considered to vest title to
alluvion soil or soil reclaimed., The Court affirmed a hold-
ing of the lower court that oyster shells above high water
mark were land if oyster shells below high water mark were
land. The Court stated:
.... It is agreed that at the outset the purpose and
intent of depositing the oyster shells was to create real
estate. The testimony does not show any chabge of
such intent or purpose as the deposit grew beyond high-
water mark, and therefore we conclude that the original
intent and purpose persisted, and that the intent and
purpose of the deposit of shells above high-water mark
was likewise to build up and create real estate. It fol-
lows that even if the circuit judge was in error in his
reasoning, such error [i. e., in holding that the oyster
shells above high-water mark were land if the oyster
shells below high-water mark made land] was without
prejudice, as his conclusion was correct.
246. Intendent & Wardens of Port Royal v. C. & W. C. Ry., 136 S. C.
525, 184 S. E. 497 (1926).
[Vol. 14.
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.... Strictly speaking, the building up of the marsh
lands in question was not accretion but was rather in
the nature of reclamation. 29 Cyc. 351 (b). But,
whether the process of building up be considered as
accretion or as reclamation, the plaintiff failed to show
that it was the owner of the adjoining high-laMds,
so as to vest in itself the title to the alluvion [sic]
soil.247
The case of Momier v. Koebig2 48 involved a situation where
a landowner and the contractor he hired to drive the neces-
sary piling for a building to be built upon "made land" were
sued for negligence in damaging nearby structures of plain-
tiff by the shaking thereof caused by driving the piles. The
building was being built upon land created by building a
"concrete retaining wall around what was formerly marsh-
land in the lower section of the City of Charleston, anud
pumping in of mud and sand from the bottom of the Ashley
River into the area behind the wall."
Judgment was directed below for the landowner, and,
on appeal, was also directed for the contractor, on the ground
that piling is customary because of the type of land in the
area, and there was no evidence to support the allegations
of negligence.
4. Usage
Although usage, as relates to marshland titles in South
Carolina, has not been defined precisely, it would include
the general custom in the coastal counties of the State to
convey and use marshlands along with the high or fast
lands to which they are appurtenant, and to deal with such
marshlands as parts of one tract consisting of high and
marsh land.
247. Id. at 541, 184 S. E. at 502.
Accretion is the act of growing to a thing, or the increase of real
estate by the addition of soil through natural causes to that already in
possession of the owner, and is usually applied to the gradual accumu-
lation of land by natural causes. Accretion is of two kinds, alluvion,
or the addition or washing up of sand or soil so as to form firm or fast
land, and dereliction, as when the sea shrinks back below the usual water-
mark. Alluvion carries the connotation of slow, periodic change, while
avulsion is sudden, rapid change of the channel of a stream or sudden gain
or loss of land by sudden action of the elements. Accretion apparently
may be applied only to gain of soil, while avulsion may mean either gain
or loss of soil. BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY, (4th ed. 1951).
248. 220 S. C. 124, 66 S. E. 2d 465 (1951).
1962]
44
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss2/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
It is easy to see how this usage arose, when it is con-
sidered that in time past, before the days of paved roads
and modern transportation, designation of navigable streams
as public highways was a necessity, and access to these
water highways, or waterways, whether across marshlands
or not, was also a necessity.249 There is considerable evidence
to show that the early settlers knew the value of the marsh-
lands adjoining their highlands, and obtained grants for
much of it, long before the time that phosphate deposits
were discovered in certain areas. In addition to access,
fertilizer for cattle, and as locations for wharves, marsh-
lands were embanked and used for the planting of rice,
where sufficient fresh water could be obtained; and the local
rice planting industry created great prosperity in its day.
We have seen that both prescription and usage applied
to tidelands at common law; 250 and at common law, usage
was admissable to interpret a grant.251 Despite these com-
mon law rules, our Court has been of the impression that
usage is not admissible to mitigate the strict rule which
the Court has persistently attributed to the common law,
namely, that a grant of marshlands carries only to high
water mark. Sworn testimony of usage was not produced
in the Pinckney case, but, too late, it was argued on ap-
peal. 252 The Cape Romaine case required language in the grant
to include the words "to low water mark," as if there were
no concept of usage at all,253 even though the result was to
abrogate several express grants under the Great Seal of the
State, most of which grants used the word "marsh" or
"marshlands" as applied to lands which were proven to be
249. See Heyward v. Chisolm, supra, note 217.
250. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 L. Ed. 331 (1894).
251. Supra, notes 42-44, 46-47.
252. It is strongly urged upon us that the line of high water, as a
limit to the rights of riparian proprietors on naviable tidal streams,
will be uncertain, inconvenient, and difficult of enforcement; that
it will be against the settled usage of our people and an injustice
to such of them as live upon the seaboard. We have heard nothing
of the 'usage' spoken of through the medium of sworn testimony
in the case. If the enforcement of the rule (it is no new law or
principle) should produce inconvenience, we would most sincerely
regret it. But finding it incumbent upon us to decide the question,
seeing clearly the rule of the common law, and failing to find any
authoriative decision which changes that rule, we must hold that
it is now, as it always has been, the law of the state. (Italics
added.) State v. Pinckney, 22 S. C. 484, at 508-509 (1884).
253. Supra, note 204.
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covered by high tide; - so that nothing except marshlands
could possibly have been intended to be granted.
254
A more reasonable viewpoint was adopted in the Oak Point
Mines case, wherein usage was conceded to carry the bound-
ary line of marshlands appurtenant and adjacent to high
land under possession, to the low water mark.255 Both
usage and prescription were recognized in Chisoim v.
Caines.2 56
END OF SECTION ONE
254. See dissent of Judge Cothran, Id. at 471, 146 S. E. at 439.
255. 22 S. C. 593 (1884).
256. Chisohn v. Caines, 67 Fed. 285 at 290 (1894).
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